公共治理研究

从2023年到2025年，三届全球AI峰会的议程，经历了从设置安全防控主题到“安全—发展”二元议题初步整合再到突出强调发展行动的嬗变，在一定程度上揭示出全球人工智能治理从安全防控范式向发展行动范式的转向。作为系统性工程，全球AI治理范式的转向主要体现为目标、主体、行动等系统构成要素的转向，即从安全到发展的目标转向，国家、企业与劳动者的主体转向，从抽象原则到具体规则的行动转向。全球AI治理范式各构成要素发生转向的具体动因不同，谋求数字技术红利的治理需求推动了从安全到发展的目标转向；国家间安全与发展的零和博弈影响治理效能推动了国家身份降维与企业、劳动者身份升维的主体转向；参与全球AI治理的各国际主体政策的分化则在一定程度上推动了从抽象原则到具体规则的行动转向。在全球AI治理范式的转向进程下，先发国际主体与后发国际主体分别持“独占优势”与“共同发展”的治理话语，先发国际主体构建排他性技术权力架构的意图因独占优势的流失而较难落地，后发国际主体秉持共同发展诉求争取更多发展空间，国际政治经济秩序也在两者的治理话语对峙中进行着隐性调整。

From 2023 to 2025, the agendas of the three consecutive Global AI Summits have undergone a transformation from setting “security prevention and control” as the theme to initially integrating the dual themes of "security-development", and then emphasizing “development action”. This to some extent reveals the shift of global AI governance from a “security prevention and control” paradigm to a “development action” paradigm. As a systematic endeavor, the shift in global AI governance paradigm is mainly reflected in the shift of system components such as goals, subjects, and actions, that is, the shift of goals from security to development, the shift of the subjects of countries, enterprises, and workers, and the shift of action from abstract principles to concrete rules. The specific reasons for the shift in various components of the global AI governance paradigm are different, and the governance demand for seeking digital technology dividends has driven the goal shift from security to development; The zero-sum game of security and development between nations has impacted governance effectiveness, driving a shift in the focus between reducing national identity and upgrading the identities of enterprises and workers; The differentiation of policies among international entities involved in global AI governance has to some extent driven the shift from abstract principles to concrete rules in action. In the process of shifting the global AI governance paradigm, the early-mover and late-mover of international entities hold governance discourses of “exclusive advantage” and “common development” respectively. The intention of the early-mover of international entities to construct an exclusive technological power structure is difficult to implement due to the loss of exclusive advantages, while the later-mover of international entities uphold the common development demands and strive for more development space. The international political and economic order is also undergoing implicit adjustments in the confrontation between the two governance discourses.